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REFLECTIONS

UPON THE  
NATURE

520.6.28.  
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AND  
USEFULNESS  
OF

LOGICK

AS IT HAS BEEN  
COMMONLY TAUGHT  
IN THE  
SCHOOLS.

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*SIC* enim, inquam, Brute, existimo, juris civilis magnum usum & apud Scævola, & apud multos fuisse, artem in hoc uno: (sc. Servio Sulpicio) quod nunquam effecisset ipsius juris scientia, nisi eam præterea didicisset artem, quæ doceret rem universam tribuere in partes, latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando, ambiguum primum videre, deinde distinguere, postremo habere regulam, qua vera & falsa judicarentur, & quæ quibus propositis essent, quæque non essent consequentia. Hic enim attulit hanc artem, omnium maximam, quasi lucem ad ea, quæ confuse ab aliis aut respondebantur, aut agebantur. Dialecticam mihi videris dicere, inquit. Recte, inquam, intelligis.

Cic. Brut.

CON.



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# REFLECTIONS

## UPON

# LOGICK.

**A**RTIFICIAL Logick<sup>1</sup> is a collection of such rules and observations, as may enable us to make the best use of our intellectual faculties, both in our own enquiries after truth, and in the communication of it to others. It differs no otherwise from Common-sense, than as it brings into view some of it's more useful maxims digested into method, and expressed in Technical Language.

It must be confessed that the share of common apprehension, which men enjoy as reasonable Beings, generally proves sufficient to conduct them in the ordinary affairs of life : But at the same time it is found to require some skill<sup>2</sup> arising from art and experience, as well as a natural strength of understanding, to carry a successful enquiry beyond the more obvious generalities

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<sup>1</sup> *Dialectica seu, differendi ratio & scientia — per omnes partes sapientiæ manat & funditur, — rem definit, genera dispertit, sequentia adjungit, perfecta concludit, vera & falsa dijudicat. Cic. Tusc. lib. 5. p. 258. Edit. Ald. Mannuc.*

<sup>2</sup> *Nec vero sine Philosophorum disciplina genus & speciem cujusque rei cernere, neque eam definiendo explicare, nec tribuere in partes possumus: nec judicare quæ vera quæ falsa sint; neque cernere consequentia, repugnantia videre, ambigua distinguere. Cic. Orat. p. 302.*

of any subject, to follow it through all the intricacies and objections which may arise, and to clear the consistency of it in all it's parts: And whoever refuses to make use of that assistance, which is offered him in the ways of close and abstruse reasoning, will infallibly find himself either totally lost or very much bewildered.

By natural sagacity a man often perceives that there is something faulty in another's reasoning, but at the same time is incapable<sup>1</sup> of discovering where the fault lies. How desirable must it be in such circumstances to have the mark pointed out precisely, to which the force of his attention should be levelled, to have his thoughts put into such a regular train as may enable him to unravel all the difficulty, apprehend the true state of the question, and weigh well the consequences arising from it? No thoughtful man, I believe, can help endeavouring to form to himself something of a rational method how to think and argue, or ever repented of giving himself some trouble upon the subject.

The use of Logick is universal, and may be maintained upon this Principle, that there is a general Analogy<sup>2</sup> in reasoning upon all subjects: so that by learning to apply it's rules to

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<sup>1</sup> Cum plerique temere ac nulla ratione causas in foro dicant; nonnulli autem propter "exercitationem, aut" consuetudinem aliquam callidius id faciant: non est dubium, quin si quis animadverterit quid sit quare alii melius quam alii dicant, id possit notare. Ergo id qui toto in genere fecerit, is si non plane attem at quasi artem quandam invenerit. *Cic. de Orat. l. 2. p. 60.*

<sup>2</sup> Indicandum reor esse quædam in omni probationum genere communia. *Quint. l. 5. c. 8. Ed. Capperon.*

familiar cases, a man becomes enabled to adapt them to any observations, which he shall chance to make afterwards. By this means he will discern<sup>1</sup>, whether he has got a view of any subject in all it's branches, and more successfully use his discretion in judging, what parts of it deserve to be considered minutely; what method he is to pursue; and how far they may be used, either as to the purposes of Civil Prudence or Natural Science.

What indeed is requisite<sup>2</sup> to a Treatise of Logick is not easy to settle to every man's satisfaction. The manner of thinking and speaking is various in different Ages and Countries. It would be endless for a Grammarian to recount all the possible deviations from common form, *Pleonasm*s, *Ellipses* &c. and therefore needless to attempt it<sup>3</sup>. As it therefore may seem sufficient for him to lay down the general rules of Orthography, Prosody, and Syntax, so may the Logician be esteemed to acquit himself of his undertaking, if he considers all the parts of Reasoning in a general

<sup>1</sup> Proprietates vocis cujusque nosse & ambigua aperire & perplexa discernere & de falsis judicare & colligere ac resolvere quæ velis, Oratoris est: quanquam ea (*Scientia*) non tam est minute atque concise in Actionibus utendum quam in Disputationibus. *Quintil.* l. 12. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Tradere destinamus — viam quandam atque rationem. Quibus demonstratis non modo in exsequendo suas quisque vires debet adhibere, sed etiam inveniendi similia, ut quæque conditio litium poscet. *Quintil.* l. 5. c. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Tradi omnia quæ ars efficit non possunt. Nam quis pictor omnia quæ in rerum natura sunt adumbrare didicit? Sed, percepta semel imitandi ratione, assimulabit quidquid acceperit. *Quintil.* l. 7. c. 10.



manner, and presents his Reader with a plan, upon which every conclusive argument must be formed.

As improvement in knowledge was ever esteemed a matter of great importance, men of wisdom and experience<sup>1</sup> from time to time have busied themselves in pointing out the means conducive to this end, and accordingly collected and methodized the observations which they formed on the working of their own Minds, or, in other words, wrote their several systems of Logick<sup>2</sup>. These were generally suited to the taste of the times, and appeared in fashionable dress. And therefore as in many former ages Scholastick Learning was most in vogue, all the treatises on this subject were wrote in abstruse Scholastick Language. --- As the taste of the present age is very different, our most celebrated performances in this way are of a quite different kind. The contempt of harsh language, and the dry Systematical method of delivering rules, and the ridicule, which has been so liberally bestowed upon the pedantry of the Schools, have led men into the contrary extreme of affecting to Philosophize in a new language, more copious, polite and elegant. But as some of

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<sup>1</sup> Homines sicut in Medicina, cum viderent alia salubria, alia insalubria, ex observatione eorum effecerunt artem; ita cum in dicendo alia utilia, alia inutilia deprehenderent, notarunt ea ad imitandum vitandumque; & quædam secundum rationem eorum adjecerunt ipsi quoque; Hæc confirmata sunt usu; tum quæ sciebat quisque docebat. *Quint.* l. 3. c. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero mentions a design that he had of writing a treatise of Logick. *Top.* p. 136.

the Scholastick Logicians endeavoured to make their Logical Systems the whole magazine of Science, and thus disparaged the real usefulness of this art by raising an expectation which they could never answer, so most of the Moderns seem to have been intent rather to give a specimen of their own improvement in knowledge, than to assist a young Learner. They launch out into various disquisitions upon abstruse subjects; and often draw the illustration of their rules from the depth of other sciences. And by this means, while they seem to enrich the mind with new discoveries, and therefore entertain the Fancy, they perplex the Judgment; While they promise to give the understanding more activity and freedom, they really rob it of that balast, by which in prudence it should be kept steady, and be prevented from being hasty and precipitant in it's determinations. Thus enquiries into the nature of our Souls, our Sensations, our Passions and Prejudices, with other springs of wrong judgment, make a part of the natural History of Man, rather than a part of Logick, and are of too mixed a nature to fall under general rules.

The turning over a variety of plans of beautiful buildings agreeably sketched out by the best Masters can scarce give a man light into the principles of Architecture; These are confessedly to be drawn from abstract truths of Geometry, and will always appear dry and tedious to a beginner. In the same manner a young Logician is more concerned to enquire into the  
*form*

*form* than the *matter* of an Argument: And he may be contented, if at his first setting out to reason he can by slow progress master a few easy subjects; if he can apprehend the order of argumentation in familiar instances, without being put out of his way by things of greater difficulty and less immediate use.

If the perusal of the above mentioned treatises be postponed, until a man has regularly received a competent degree of knowledge from the proper sources of other Sciences; they may then direct him how to digest, how to reflect with advantage upon what he knows already, and point out the particulars wherein he is deficient. In the mean time they, who can effectually resolve to bestow their attention upon what is fallen under the censure and ridicule of some parts of the present Polite World, may find their account in making the first regulation of their understandings upon the old Plan. Novelty would be far from being a recommendation to any performance of this kind: For as good sense and truth will be always the same, the received principles of reasoning must be invariable. At the same time therefore that we admire the ingenuity and great learning of latter Philosophers, let the exact method and accuracy of the Scholastick, Systematical Logicians be entitled to our praise and imitation.

If the manuals of this sort of Logick have not always given sufficient satisfaction to the inquisitive Learners, the reason of this is very plain. They were intended as an introduction  
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to Scholastick writers; and to stop<sup>r</sup> as soon as we have gone through them would be much the same, as to rest contented with the perusal of the Grammar of any Language, without proceeding to the study of those other writings, for which it was contrived. In either case our pains may seem ill employed; as tending only to furnish us with a technical set of words and phrases, without our knowing any thing of their use and application. --- But, at the same time it may be observed, that there is such an affinity between all languages, that the grammatical principles of any one, well understood, will much facilitate a man's improvement in any other: In like manner, every man may safely promise himself the general advantage of being made acquainted with the construction of all reasoning from the treatises, of which I am speaking.

It must moreover be confessed, that the general rules lay'd down in Manuals of Logick are at first to be got by rote, and that their use and meaning cannot clearly be understood, until a man has had occasion to make an application of them to particular cases. But it would be unreasonable to be discouraged by this objection, which equally affects all other Arts, that are delivered in a Doctrinal method.

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1 Dicta sunt omnia antequam præciperentur, mox ea Scriptores observata & collecta ediderunt. — Sed non magis hoc sat est, quam palæstram didicisse nisi corpus exercitatione, continentia, cibis, ante omnia natura juvetur; sicut contra ne illa quidem satis sine arte profecerint. *Quint.* l. 5. c. 10.

B

Nay,

Nay, is not every part of Education attended with some burdensome formalities, which are designed only to be of temporary use? --- The genteeler kinds of Youthful exercises, at the time of Practise, certainly put the body under unnatural restraints: Yet this affected stiffness of the School is found to wear off easily in good company, and is succeeded by such a settled gracefulness as well as strength, as distinguishes the air of a well-bred Courtier from the approach of an unmanaged, though perhaps well-proportioned, Rustick. The application is easy and just with regard to Logick; with this difference however, that the eye of every common Spectator is a ready judge of the propriety of carriage; whereas it requires an improved Taste, to distinguish just reasoning from the irregular flights of a lively imagination.

Let a Young Gentleman consider Logick as a part of his Education not as his Profession<sup>1</sup>: if it makes him acquainted with the instruments of reasoning, and puts<sup>2</sup> his natural faculties into a regular disposition, it fully answers it's purpose: His real improvement in the art of Rea-

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<sup>1</sup> Non tantum ingenioso homini, & ei, qui forum, qui curiam, qui causas, qui remp. spectet, opus esse arbitror temporis, quantum sibi ii sumperunt, quos discennes vita defecit. Omnes enim artes aliter ab iis tractantur, qui eas ad usum transferunt; aliter ab iis, qui ipsarum artium tractatu delectati, nihil in vita sunt aliud acturi. *Cic. de Orat.* l. 3. p. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Non respiciendum ad hæc, sed in promptu habenda: nec tanquam tradita, sed tanquam innata. Nam viam demonstrare velociter ars potest, si qua est; verum ars satis præstat, si copias eloquentiæ ponit in medio: nostrum est uti eis scire. *Quintil.* l. 7. c. 10.

soning will all along be proportioned to the progress, which he shall make in Science; as a man's grammatical skill will gradually encrease, while he continues to exercise himself in Language. The Logician, if he has the common opportunities of improving his Rhetorick and his skill in other Sciences, (which ought always to be supposed when we would form a true estimate of the usefulness of Logick) will be under no necessity of pestering his Audience or Company with the language of the Schools; though at the same time he will find here a compendious direction, how to apply his own knowledge, and how to examine the reasonings of other men.

Upon the whole, Logick, as I have already hinted, has the same effect upon reasoning, as Grammar has upon speaking. The usefulness of both entirely depends upon their application. They are a kind of foundation to Wisdom and Eloquence, which is not designed to appear above ground, though necessary to give strength and support to the finest Superstructures. And, as a man habituated to a good style shall at length come to disregard, and even to forget his Grammar rules, so is it not uncommon to find a good Reasoner giving himself the air of ridiculing those Logical forms, that at first served to methodise his thoughts and still influence the course of his Reasoning.



THE FIRST part of Logick<sup>1</sup> is designed to *prepare* us for passing true judgments upon things, which can then only be done with certainty, when our Ideas are distinct, and our Words determinate in their signification.

And indeed, since it depends upon accident, what things we think or talk of first, we must expect no small confusion in the natural state of our ideas. It will require some pains and attention to remove this inconvenience, and make them fit materials for reasoning with upon difficult subjects; "There are many seemingly plain questions, which a man cannot answer, 'til their meaning be distinguished; Many Propositions, seemingly determinate, have more meanings than one, and are true or false, according to the sense, in which they are taken. It is for want of the question's being stated, and

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I Qui Eloquentiæ laude ducatur — noverit primum vim, naturam, genera verborum & simplicium & copulatum: deinde quot modis quidque dicatur: qua ratione verum falsumne sit, judicetur; quid efficiatur e quoque; quod cui consequens sit, quidque contrarium; cumque ambigue multa dicantur, quo modo quidque eorum dividi, explanarique oporteat. Hæc tenenda sunt Oratori. — Et, quoniam in omnibus, quæ ratione docentur & via, primum constituendum est, quid quidque sit; (Nisi enim inter eos, qui disceptant, convenit, quid sit illud, de quo ambigitur; nec recte differi, nec unquam ad exitum perveniri potest) explicanda est sæpe verbis mens nostra de quaque re, atque involutæ rei notitia definiendo aperienda est: — Tum — explicato genere cuiusque rei, videndum est, quæ sint ejus generis sive formæ sive partes; ut in eas tribuatur omnis Oratio. *Cic. Orat.* p. 326, 327.

the terms defined, that a wrangle<sup>1</sup> is kept up by a verbal contradiction, each person meaning what he says, in a different respect<sup>2</sup>. It is this, that gives an artful man the opportunity of seeming plausible to his followers, and working upon their passions by the misapplication of specious Names; and also, on the other hand, it is the want of clear and determinate ideas, that makes a well-meaning man grow ridiculous in his own conduct, and unreasonably censorious of other men's.

To prevent therefore these ill effects<sup>3</sup>, by *Definition* we settle within ourselves, and explain to others, what ideas we combine in any notion, or in the word, by which we represent it. By *Division* we examine the ideas of others, or rejudge our own, by taking them to pieces; considering the Number of the parts, and the Order, in which they stand united: The Operation of the mind in both these cases is much the same, and is as often to be repeated, as any danger of mistake shall make it necessary;

<sup>1</sup> Necesse est ideo nominis esse controversiam, non quod de ipsa re non conveniat, non quod de facto non constet, sed quod id, quod factum sit, aliud alii videatur esse, & ideo alius alio nomine id appellet. Quare — definienda res erit verbis & breviter describenda. *Cic. de Invent. l. 1. p. 20.*

<sup>2</sup> Mr Norris.

<sup>3</sup> Cum accepto causæ genere, & cognito, rem tractare cœpi, nihil prius constituo, quam quid sit illud, quo mihi referenda sit omnis illa oratio, quæ sit propria quæstionis. *Cic. de Orat. l. 2. p. 76.*

Facillime auditor discit, & quid agatur intelligit, si complectare à principio genus naturamque causæ; si Definias, si Dividas, si neque prudentiam ejus impediatis confusione partium, nec memoriam multitudine. *Cic. Partit. Orat. p. 322.*

The object of it is only one single notion at a time.

For this purpose <sup>1</sup> the doctrine of the *Predicables* may merit some attention, as it gives us the method, how to draw out any subject into a particular view; how to consider accurately such Natures as, though blended together in reality, are distinguishable by an act of the mind; and how to observe that similitude, which may be found in ideas, that seem altogether different, and, again, the differences of those, that seem alike.

Whether Philosophers have been right or wrong in their application of the terms, which are there made use of, or in assigning their proper *Essences* to things in virtue of that doctrine; Or, whether their reasoning concerning the nature of *Universals* be well grounded or no; Yet thus much is certain, that since all <sup>2</sup> explanations of words and things, all reasoning <sup>3</sup> depends upon the help of general ideas and general terms; it will be useful, if not necessary, for the sake of memory and order, to have some certain classes, wherein, after being compared

<sup>1</sup> Quidquid est, de quo ratione & via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam, speciemque redigendum. *Cic. Orat.* p. 302.

<sup>2</sup> Finitioni subjecta maxime videntur (i. e. ad rem definiendam conducunt) Genus, Species, Differens, Proprium. *Quint.* l. 5. c. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Omnes Controversiæ ad Universi generis vim & naturam referuntur. *Cic. de Orat.* l. 2. p. 79.

In omni speciali utique inest generalis, ut quæ sit prior. *Quint.* l. 3. c. 5. — ut non est satis generalem tractasse quæstionem; ita perveniri ad speciem, nisi illa prius excussa, non potest. *ib.*



and sorted, they may be set together: Though it is scarce possible, but that we should be sometimes mistaken, and perhaps also run into some inconvenience by such mistake. But without some method of distinction, we could not ascertain our notions, so as to reason and discourse intelligibly about them; we could not be certain, when we write with method, nor examine, either how far others observe it, or how much of their subject they have exhausted. And agreeably hereto we find, that Naturalists generally pursue this method of reducing within the compass of regular examination, that almost infinite variety of Fossils, Plants, Animals, &c. which fall under their notice.

The design of *Aristotle* being to clear away the perplexities, in which the *Sophists* of his time had involved the art of reasoning, many of the observations, which occur in the first part of his Logical works, seem intended to facilitate the apprehension of his rules, and to secure himself from the attacks of that set of men, and are therefore in a great measure relative to them. As for the *Predicaments*, He does not seem to have laid any great stress on the division itself, nor to have offered it to the world, as an extraordinary discovery. Some of his observations here, as well as in the introduction, are evidently critical upon the Greek language. And indeed such is the connexion between thinking and speaking, that Logick and philosophical Grammar must often coincide. Though there is a necessary order establish-  
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ed in our thoughts by nature, yet the method of expressing them to others, or distinguishing them within ourselves, must in some measure partake of the peculiarities of the language, which is made use of for those purposes. Hence many observations and distinctions, which might be pertinent in Greek and Latin, would sound strange and trifling to an English ear. And perhaps the Schoolmen cannot alway stand clear of having overstrained their point, in pressing some observations into the service of the Latin tongue, which were useful only in the Greek. Moreover,

If some other remarks, occurring in the treatise of the *Predicaments*, are adapted to the following parts of the *Aristotelick* Philosophy; they are become less material to us, with whom the state of philosophy, *Natural*, *Moral*, and *Metaphysical*, is much altered in the most important articles, if not in it's very principles: The two last by Christian Theology; and the former, by the new method of experimental observations illustrated by Mathematical reasoning. The remarks, which are of more general use, are coincident with the doctrine of the *Predicables*, and may therefore be as well taken notice of under that head. And therefore should the Learned think fit to discard this series, we may be contented with such an account of it, as may barely suffice to make some valuable writers intelligible, whose manner of treating their subjects is formed upon the plan of that division. ---- Not but  
that

that they, who are masters of scholastick language, may usefully assist their invention, by having recourse to this series, drawn out into it's most minute particulars, as a collection of general heads, which represent the several views, in which any subject may be considered.

For how much soever the *Predicaments* may have been exposed to ridicule by the fond extravagance of some Admirers, yet a better class of general heads does not often occur<sup>1</sup>. To

<sup>1</sup> In eo est *Status* causæ (i. e. *caput generale*, ad quod probationes partium referantur,) quod est in eo potentissimum, & in quo maxime res vertitur. — *Aristoteles* decem elementa constituit, circa quæ versari videatur omnis quæstio; *Oὐσία* seu *Essentiam*, neque sane aliud est ejus nomen Latinum; Eâ quæritur *an Sit*; *Qualitatem*, cujus apertus intellectus (seu *significatio*) est. *Quantitatem*, quæ dupliciter à posterioribus divisa est; quam magnum & quam multum sit. *Ad aliquid*, unde ductæ *translatio* & *comparatio* (sc. *an huic jus agendi sit*, *vel facere aliquid conveniat*, *an contra hunc*, *an hoc tempore*, *an sic*.) Post hæc *Ubi* & *Quando*; deinde *Facere*, *Pati*; *Habere*, quod est quasi armatum esse & vestitum esse; Novissime *Κεῖσθαι*, quod est compositum esse quodammodo, ut, *sedere*, *stare*, *jacere*. Sed ex his omnibus prima quatuor ad *Status* pertinere, cætera ad quosdam locos argumentorum videntur. — And soon after, though he chuses to express himself in a different manner, from what some other Rhetoricians usually did, the Class of general heads, which he adopts as the best, is very nearly the same with the *Predicamental*. — Credendum est iis, quorum auctoritatem secutus est Cicero, tria esse, quæ in omni disputatione quærantur, *An sit*, *Quid sit*, *Quale sit*; quod ipsa nobis etiam Natura præscribit. Nam primum oportet subesse aliquid, de quo ambigitur, quod, *quid sit*, & *quale sit*, certe non potest æstimari, nisi prius esse constiterit; Ideoque ea est prima quæstio: Sed non statim, quod esse manifestum est, etiam *quid sit* apparet. Hoc quoque constituto, novissima *qualitas* superest: nec his exploratis aliud est ultra. — At *quantum* & *quam multum*, & *ad aliquid* & (suppl. "*causæ status*") *comparativus* — semper in parte aut conjecturæ aut qualitatis ponenda sunt, (i. e. *specialem quæstionis oratoriæ statum non constituunt*, sed *ad quæstionem de facto aut qualitate revocantur*) ut *qua mente*, & *quo tempore*, *quo loco* (suppl. *quis quid fecerit*.) *Quint.* l. 3. c. 6.



mention no other instances, let any matter of fact come before a Lawyer; In what Views can it offer itself to his consideration more naturally, than in the *Predicamental*? viz.

Whether it *was done*, and what it *is*?

(*Substantia.*)

What are its *qualities*, good or bad?

(*Qualitas.*)

In *what degree*? (*Quantitas.*)

How is it found upon *comparison* with *other things*? (*Relatio.*)

Who was the *Doer*? (*Actio.*)

Who was the *Sufferer*? (*Passio.*)

How it appears in point of *Time*, when?

(*Quando.*)

--- *Place*, where? (*Ubi.*)

--- *Posture*, in which it was done? (*Situs.*)

--- Other *incidental* circumstances attending it? (*Habitus.*)

IN THE SECOND part is considered the Agreement and Disagreement of ideas, as signified by *Affirmation* and *Negation*.

And here, the general doctrine of *Propositions*, though it be obvious to any man of common capacity and ordinary attention, deserves to be drawn out into distinct rules. For want of taking a little pains to imprint something of this kind distinctly upon their memories, men of quick parts are often at a loss to say, how far an assertion extends, and what is implied in it. They apprehend some propositions to be inconsistent, others to be equivalent, and convertible,

vertible, which really are not so; and thereby grossly overshoot themselves, when they come to judge, and draw conclusions from given premisses.

THE THIRD part contains the doctrine of *Syllogisms*; whereby we learn how to compare successively two ideas with a third, in order to see, how far they agree or disagree with that, and consequently with one another.

It may be observed here, how mutually subservient the three parts of Logick are to each other. Experience may convince us, that our mistakes in *Judging* and *Reasoning* take their rise, as frequently from our want of care in considering the ideas of *simple Apprehension*, as from our combining them improperly, or making inferences in a wrong form. Before we offer to pronounce concerning the agreement or disagreement between ideas, we should carefully examine into their nature, and settle precisely what is implied in them: But in many cases, especially those, that are remote from common observation, it depends upon the due exercise of our *Judgment* and *Reasoning* to settle those ideas, which when considered singly, are the object of *simple Apprehension*. If a Rustick judges and reasons wrong upon matters of Religion, Philosophy, and Politicks, it is in a great measure owing to his not having precise and just ideas of what he pretends to be a judge of: On the other hand, it is scarce possible for any man to settle and ascertain his Ideas in  
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mention no other instances, let any matter of fact come before a Lawyer; In what Views can it offer itself to his consideration more naturally, than in the *Predicamental*? viz.

Whether it *was done*, and what it *is*?

(*Substantia.*)

What are it's *qualities*, good or bad?

(*Qualitas.*)

In *what degree*? (*Quantitas.*)

How is it found upon *comparison* with other things? (*Relatio.*)

Who was the *Doer*? (*Actio.*)

Who was the *Sufferer*? (*Passio.*)

How it appears in point of *Time*, when?

(*Quando.*)

--- *Place*, where? (*Ubi.*)

--- *Posture*, in which it was done? (*Situs.*)

--- Other *incidental* circumstances attending it? (*Habitus.*)

IN THE SECOND part is considered the Agreement and Disagreement of ideas, as signified by *Affirmation* and *Negation*.

And here, the general doctrine of *Propositions*, though it be obvious to any man of common capacity and ordinary attention, deserves to be drawn out into distinct rules. For want of taking a little pains to imprint something of this kind distinctly upon their memories, men of quick parts are often at a loss to say, how far an assertion extends, and what is implied in it. They apprehend some propositions to be inconsistent, others to be equivalent, and convertible,



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such Matters, without a previous exercise of his understanding, in comparing things together, observing their agreement or disagreement, and drawing inferences for that purpose: And consequently, a Man must not expect to find himself a thorough Master of the first part of Logick, 'till he shall have made some proficiency in the use of the second and third.

Now it must be own'd, that in discourse upon <sup>1</sup> ordinary matters, we have no occasion, either to put ourselves to the trouble of continually applying a common standard, or <sup>2</sup> to tie ourselves up to the strictness of Scholastick form, in order to perceive the agreement or disagreement above-mentioned: Nor can it be any great edification to an inquisitive Student to be told in such variety of form, as sometimes he is in treatises of Scholastick Logick, that *Man is an Animal*. But yet he may find his account in learning those general rules, which

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<sup>1</sup> In rebus — apertis argumentari tam sit stultum, quam in clarissimum solem mortale lumen inferre. *Quint.* l. 5. c. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Ego, ut in oratione Syllogismo quidem aliquando uti nefas non duco; ita constare totam, aut certe confertam esse *aggressionum & enthymematum* stipitatione minime velim. Dialogis enim & dialecticis disputationibus erit similior, quam nostri operis actionibus: quæ quidem inter se plurimum differunt. Namque illi homines docti, & inter doctos verum quærentes, minutius & scrupulosius scrutantur omnia, & ad liquidum confessumque perducunt. — Nobis ad aliorum judicia componenda est oratio, & sapius apud omnino imperitos, atque aliarum certe ignaros literarum loquendum est; quos nisi & delectatione allicimus, & viribus trahimus, & nonnunquam turbamus affectibus; ipsa, quæ iusta ac vera sunt, tenere non possumus. *id.* c. 14. *which latter clause, while it shews the inexpediency of an Orator's confining himself upon all occasions to strict Logical form, evidently points out it's usefulness, when we impartially examine, or explain any subject.*

are applicable, as a test, to all reasoning, however varied or disguised by the advantage of witty turns and good Language. "Syllogism is a measure to us in the management and disposal of our own thoughts, and in our reasonings and discourses to others; wherein we cannot otherwise avoid confusion and disorder, than by considering, what the conclusion is we would prove; by what mediums we would prove it; and to which part of the argument, (*Major, Minor or Conclusion*) this or that particular part of our discourse relates: If our discourse be not always laid out in the exact formality of Syllogism, yet we should have a kind of Syllogistical plan before us; that so in every stage of our discourse, we may know where-about we are, and what we are doing.

Syllogism moreover will be a measure whereby to judge of the discourses of others; pointing out what is the conclusion, they offer to prove; what the premisses are, whereby they prove it; and whether such premisses do indeed prove such conclusion. By reducing it to Syllogism, You see all the parts of an argument in miniature; what truly belongs to it; and what is put in only for shew, and pomp, and amusement; and every part in it's proper place and order, and withal what connexion one part has with another<sup>1</sup>".

And indeed so natural, is this form of argumentation, that not only in cases of *Divinity* and

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<sup>1</sup> Mr Norris.



*Metaphysicks*, but in *Law* likewise, all reasoning, if pertinent and conclusive, must, after a due separation of parts, be finally resolvable into it. In stating the Legality or Illegality of any action, the Law itself, whereby the nature of it is estimated, is truly the *Major* of a Syllogism, and the application of the Action to it, is a real *Minor*.

The same may be said of Demonstrations, properly <sup>1</sup> Mathematical, concerning Number, Extension, and Figure; only with this difference, that by the help of visible figures and diagrams, a man is enabled, both readily to apprehend and retain a continued chain of deductions in a series of *Enthymems*, without drawing out both premisses into a complete form.

As for the <sup>2</sup> *Matter* of Argumentation, Logicians as such, cannot pretend to offer much assistance. They observe only, and that truly enough, that whoever reasons upon any subject, must draw his argument, either from it's

<sup>1</sup> Quid? Illa propositarum questionum (sc. in *Geometria*) conclusio non tota fere constat Syllogismis? *Quintil.* l. 1. c. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Accordingly Antonius says of it by way of reproach, In hac arte — nullum est præceptum quomodo verum inveniatur, sed tantum est quo judicetur. *Cic. de Orat.* l. 2. p. 83.

At quomodo inveniemus illas occultas quæstiones (sc. quæ sunt ex liis alicujus proprietate eruendæ?) scilicet quomodo sententias, verba, figuras, colores; ingenio, cura, exercitatione. *Quintil.* l. 7. c. 1.

Si tu mihi quamvis eruditum hominem adduxeris, quamvis acrem & acutum in cogitando, — si erit idem in consuetudine civitatis, in exemplis, in institutis, in moribus ac voluntatibus civium suorum hospes, non multum ei loci proderunt illi, ex quibus argumenta promuntur. *Cic. de Orat.* l. 2. p. 79.

more <sup>1</sup> general or particular nature, or from something peculiar to the individual, which he considers, whether intimately and essentially united to it, or <sup>2</sup> accidentally connected with, or resulting from it.

And in this view, they reckon up the most material considerations of things, such as *Cause*, *Effect*, *Object*, *Adjunct*, &c. assigning to each such maxims or propositions, as all men may be supposed to agree in, and which therefore are suited to the purposes of <sup>3</sup> artificial disputation, and useful for conviction.

And indeed, when <sup>4</sup> we have found our observations hold good in many particular instances, we may afterwards with some assurance use them, both as compendious heads, under

<sup>1</sup> Argumenta reperiuntur, aut in quaestionibus, quæ etiam separata à complexu rerum personarumque spectari per se possunt; (*Græce* *ἑρως* dict. *Quint.* l. 3. c. 5.) aut in ipsa causâ, cum invenitur aliquid in eâ, non ex communi ratione ductum, sed ejus judicii, de quo cognoscitur, proprium. (*Græce* *ἰσχυρως* dict. *Quint.* l. 3. c. 5.) *Quint.* l. 5. c. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Thus in arguing upon any case of *Adultery*, &c. Communes loci — ab illo generali tractatu (sc. quo peroratur in ipsa vitia citra personas) ad quasdam species deduci solent, ut si ponatur Adulter cæcus, Aleator pauper &c. *Quint.* l. 2. c. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Isti, qui docent, cum causas in plura genera secuerunt, singulis generibus argumentorum copiam suggerunt. Quod etiam si ad instituendos Adolescentulos magis aptum est, ut, simul ac posita sit causa, habeant quo se referant, unde statim expedita possint argumenta depromere; tamen tardi ingenii est, rivulos confectari, fontes rerum non videre. *Cic. de Orat.* l. 2. p. 77.

<sup>4</sup> Hæc non idcirco dico, quod inutilem horum locorum, ex quibus argumenta ducuntur, cognitionem putem: — sed ne, siqui cognoverint ista, si cætera negligant, perfectos se protinus atque consummatos putent. *Quint.* l. 5. c. 10.

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which to <sup>1</sup> common-place our knowledge, and as principles of argumentation, about all things of the same sort. But 'til then, the Scholastick maxims will not always appear intelligible, nor be easily stated, as the different subjects, to which they are to be applied, require. Those, which want either clearness or connexion, may be apt to burden the memory; and as for the rest, which are confessedly self-evident, they will at any time approve themselves to every man's understanding.

As for *Method*<sup>2</sup> or the art of disposing the several parts of a larger train of reasoning, with perspicuity, and ease, and pertinency to some important conclusion, it is not to be expected in any greater degree from the precepts of a Logician, than the excellence of a good style can be from those of a Grammarian. A man of abstruse reflection may indeed reduce the <sup>3</sup> several

<sup>1</sup> Hi Loci ei demum Oratori prodesse possunt, qui est versatus in rebus vel usu, quem ætas denique affert; vel auditione & cogitatione, quæ studio & diligentia præcurrit ætatem. *Cic. de Orat. l. 2. p. 79.*

<sup>2</sup> Dispositio est utilis rerum & partium in locos distributio. *Quinct. l. 7. c. 1.* — si certa aliqua via tradi in omnes materias ullo modo posset, non tam paucis contigisset. Sed, cum infinitæ litium formæ fuerint, futuræque sint, & tot seculis nulla reperta sit causa, quæ esset tota alteri similis, sapiat oportet Actor, & vigilet, & inveniatur, & judicet, & consilium à seipso petat. *id. Prefat. ad l. 7.*

<sup>3</sup> Quidam executi sunt verbosius — quo quæque res modo dici posset, ostendere: sed mihi supervacuum videbatur. Nam & fere apparet, quid — dicendum sit. Et de omnibus omnia dicere infinitum est, tam hercule, quam si controversiarum, quæ sunt, quæque futuræ sunt, quæstiones, argumenta, sententias, tradere velim. *Quinct. l. 5. c. 12.*



niceties, as well as more common beauties of argumentation, to settled rules; but the benefit to be received from thence, will not probably be equivalent to the trouble of learning them, or to the perplexity, that will attend the use of them.

To think masterly of any subject, and adjust our thoughts with elegance, will require a considerable time, and is the effect not so much of rule, as of habitual exercise in the conversation and writings of good reasoners. If the difference of imagination in different men did not render the train, and turn of their sentiments different, according to each writer's peculiar genius; yet the manner of pursuing an enquiry, and arranging our thoughts, ought to be <sup>1</sup> diversified upon different subjects. Rules drawn out in this view would be different, with respect to every different Author; and must at all times be <sup>2</sup> fitted to the particular reasoning, whereof they contain the analysis: And however useful an analysis may be to facilitate our understanding a book already written, yet, I believe, few men could succeed in writing, through a scrupulous observance of any <sup>3</sup> other

<sup>1</sup> Nemo a me exigat id præceptorum genus, — ut quasi quasdam leges immutabili necessitate constrictas studiosis seram. *id.* J. 2. c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Omnem collocationem ad finem accommodo quæstionis. *Cic. Partit. Orat. p. 285.*

In Judiciis non eadem est collocatio Actoris & Rei. *id.* 290.

<sup>3</sup> Illa potentissima est, quæque vere dicitur *Oeconomica* totius causæ dispositio, quæ constitui, nisi velut in re præsentī, non potest; ubi assumendum proœmium, ubi omittendum &c. — Hæc — præstat omnia, cui affuerint natura, doctrina, studium. Quare

general plan, than what they themselves have drawn.

It may be time enough, if we take our directions occasionally in our passage through the arts and sciences, how to resolve our notions into a series of causes and effects; and how to pursue them through several consequences, deductions, and complex notions, 'till they are at last formed into regular Schemes and rational Systems: The use of Logick at the same time must even here be confessed to be considerable, though it teacheth us no more, than to take a single step with caution and security; though it supplies us only with a rule, whereby to measure any single parts of our reasoning, and bring their strength successively to the test.

To return therefore to the proper province of a Logician; The scholastick doctrine of Syllogisms is confessedly very ingenious. It is comprized within three or four technical lines, and therefore, one would think, should be without much difficulty accomodated to the Apprehension, and familiarized to the Understanding. But perhaps nothing can do this so effectually, as a little exercise in Scholastick Disputations. Those, that are strictly Logical, are intended to habituate a Young beginner both to the use of Logical terms, and an acquaintance with it's rules. The principles of

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nemo expectet, ut alieno tantum labore sit disertus. Vigilandum ducat, iterum enitendum, pallendum: Est facienda sua cuique vis, iustus, sua ratio. *Quintil.* l. 7. c. 10.

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the debate, and the precise explication of the words to be made use of, being ready drawn out to his hand by Logical writers; he will have no intricacy in his subject to fatigue his invention, and may therefore more easily attend to the form of argumentation, observe it's accuracy, or correct it when deficient.

Although therefore it be confessed, that, as in Grammar, so in Logick, a man ought to be a Master of the art, before he presumes to decide concerning the nature or justice of it's rules; Yet, in this view <sup>1</sup>, the exercise in a Young beginner will not be preposterous; Nor will a little of his time and pains be mispent in Logical disputation, though it bring with it no immediate encrease of knowledge. And if, afterwards, he should for a while confine himself to syllogistick form upon Theological and Philosophical subjects; 'tis true, he will be check'd in his speed, and prevented from ranging over a great extent of argument in a short time: But by such exercise, a habit of accuracy will at length insinuate itself into his discourse, even at those times, when he shall have occasion to exert himself as an <sup>2</sup> Orator. He may then dis-

<sup>1</sup> Omnino omnis Argumentatio, & ejus reprehensio majorem quandam vim continet, & latius patet, quam hic exponitur: Sed ejus artificii cognitio hujusmodi est, ut non ad hujus artis partem aliquam adjungi possit, sed ipsa separatim longi temporis, & magnæ atque arduæ cognitionis indigeat. *Cic. de Invent. l. i. p. 74.*

<sup>2</sup> Esse perfecte eloquentis puto, non eam solum facultatem habere, quæ sit ejus propria, fusa, lateque dicendi, sed etiam vicinam ejus, atque finitimam Dialecticorum scientiam assumere. *Cic. Orat. p. 326.*



card<sup>1</sup> those parts of his Syllogisms, which a common share of apprehension in his hearer or reader can supply, and with a better grace, as well as spirit, attempt to embellish his work, when he is secure, that the substance of it is well cemented.

In general, *Disputation* is very<sup>2</sup> useful, as it habituates us to bring a question to the point; as it exercises, and puts the spirits upon their activity; as it disciplines our notions, and makes them ready to appear upon summons: Add to this, that the keeping our understanding upon the stretch, whether upon the offensive, or defensive, has a natural tendency to strengthen it's powers; Our thoughts will mechanically<sup>3</sup> fall

1 Ut Palastrici doctores illos, quos *numeros* vocant, non idcirco discentibus tradunt, ut his omnibus ii, qui didicerint, in ipso luctandi certamine utantur, (plus enim pondere & firmitate & spiritu agitur) sed ut subsit copia illa, ex qua unum aut alterum, cujus se occasio dederit, efficiant; Ita hæc pars *Dialectica*, sive illam maxime dicere *Disputatricem*, ut est utilis sæpe finitionibus & comprehensionibus (sc. *verborum*) & separandis, quæ sunt differentia, & resolvendâ ambiguitate, & distinguendo, dividendo, illiciendo, implicando; ita, si totum sibi vindicaverit in foro certamen, obstabit melioribus, & sectas ad tenuitatem suam vires ipsa subtilitate consumet. *Quint.* l. 12. c. 2.

2 Fateor me Oratorem, si modo sum, aut etiam quicumque sum, non ex Rhetorum officinis, sed ex Academiae spatiis extitisse. Illa enim sunt curricula multiplicium variorumque sermonum, in quibus Platonis primum impressa sunt vestigia: sed & hujus, & aliorum philosophorum disputationibus & exagitationibus maxime Orator est, & adjutus. *Cic. Orat.* p. 302.

3 Hoc exercitatione multa consequendum; ut, quemadmodum illorum artificum (sc. *Citharædorum*,) etiam si alio spectant, manus tamen ipsa consuetudine ad graves, acutos, mediosque horum sonos fertur; sic oratoris cogitationem nihil moretur hæc varietas argumentorum & copia; sed quasi offerat se, & occurrat; & ut literæ syllabæque scribentium cogitationem non exigunt, sic rationes sponte quadam sequantur. *Quint.* l. 5. c. 10.

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into that train, to which they have been accustomed, without any exerted act of memory, and perhaps without our being able to quote the rule of our argumentation. Moreover, "since disputation is intended, not so much for the discovery of truth, as for trial and exercise; there can be no harm, or shame, if, as the Opponent argues against a plain truth, to see whether the Respondent can defend it; so the Respondent be allowed to deny a plain truth, if not uncapable of proof, to see whether the Opponent can prove it<sup>1</sup>".

As for the many *Terms*, that appear *barbarous* in Treatises of old Logick, they agree with all other names in this, that they are no farther useful to be learnt, than as we have occasion to frame those abstract conceptions, of which they are the ordinary marks. Men of deep thought, and strong attention, are sometimes apt to flatter themselves, that they ascertain their notions with greater accuracy, than those that have gone before them; and thus the *Schoolmen* encreased the language of philosophical subtilties. But the attempt of the *Moderns* towards a reformation, by coining new terms, has by no means removed the abuse. --- The terms of Logick, which is an art purely instrumental, are of no more intrinsick value, than the Grammatical names of *Substantive*, *Adjective*, *Verb* &c. They, who have not sagacity or attention enough to distinguish Scholastick notions, can make no

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<sup>1</sup> Mr Norris,

use of the names: Nor indeed is it of general and necessary use for all men to attain such nicety. But the Professors of all abstracted knowledge, must contrive some method for more easily recording their notions thereupon, with greater expedition and preciseness. And thus, every art<sup>1</sup> and every trade, has names, that are useless and unintelligible to any, but those, who are conversant in their respective operations. Some few of the old scholastick terms have been, for want of better, transferred into modern treatises upon most philosophical subjects; as others have been incorporated into common speech: And as for the rest, (however they have been misapplied in particular instances by injudicious writers) they are not always found to be that unintelligible jargon, which some are pleased to call them: But when neither the course of a young Gentleman's study in the University, nor his profession out of it, will probably require a knowledge of them; it will be no more disparagement to let them alone, than not to turn over the Dictionary of a language, which he has no occasion to understand.

The same may be said of Scholastick *Distinctions*. They are in many cases necessary to prevent confusion, and therefore it would be to exercise a refined taste very unseasonably, to

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<sup>1</sup> *Qualitates* appellavi, quas *ποιότητες* Græci vocant: quod ipsum apud Græcos non est vulgi verbum, sed philosophorum, atque id in multis. Dialecticorum quoque verba nulla sunt publica: suis utuntur: & id quoque commune omnium fere artium. *Cic. Acad. Quest. l. 1. p. 38.*



take offence at them when rightly applyed. I shall only add, that, if we are not disgusted at their quaintness, their brevity is no small commendation in their favour. So long as the circumstances of human nature shall make it necessary for us to communicate our thoughts by means of language, it will be impossible to keep clear of ambiguities; and therefore, whether we are pleased with the old Scholastick terms of Distinction or no, they, or some others of an equivalent import, must be adopted.

Since the decline of Scholastick learning, though Science of every kind has received prodigious improvements by the labour and sagacity of exalted Genius's, yet we find the common run of reasoners as bad as ever; --- not more knowing, but much more conceited; --- not so ambitious to improve their knowledge, as to conceal their ignorance; --- determining magisterially upon points, without knowing or considering the first principles, of what they are discoursing of; --- taking themselves to be masters of every subject, upon which they can raise an objection', --- and adventuring to make their first essays in the face of the world, which a more modest set of men formerly thought hazardous enough within the circle of a publick School. So that to be trifling and positive are

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I Accusationibus etiam mediocres in dicendo suffecerunt: bonus defensor nemo, nisi qui eloquentissimus fuit. Nam — tanto est accusare, quam defendere, quanto facere, quam sanare vulnera facilius. *Quint.* l. 5. c. 13.

infirmities, not so much owing to the Schools, as to the warmth and unexperience of youth. The human mind is a soil naturally productive of them in all ages, and is naturally weeded by experience and meditation.

Let me add that, however Scholastick learning has been decry'd, a man of thoughtful disposition, leisure, and mature judgment, will always find useful entertainment among it's more ingenious writers. Where, if he does not always acquiesce in their determinations, yet he will admire a remarkable sagacity in canvassing a question; though he will sometimes laugh at the doubles of their distinctions, and the mist of words, which they industriously throw over the plainest subjects; yet he may from thence be apprized, how to guard against the same little subterfuges, and arts of disguise, which, by misapplication of language, are every day put in practise in matters of civil commerce and conversation.

I have endeavoured to give some weight to the foregoing reflections by subjoining a specimen of the sentiments of *Cicero* and *Quintilian*. Their observations upon the nature and useful-

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I Scholastici quantum ingenio valeant sæpe ostendunt: sed in infelicia & artium bonarum ignara secula inciderunt: quominus mirum si inter multa laudanda, aliqua & condonanda sunt. Tamen ubi in re *morum* consentiunt, vix est ut errent: quippe perspicaces admodum ad ea videnda, quæ in aliorum dictis reprehendi possunt: in quo ipso tamen diversa tuendi studio laudabile præbent modestiæ exemplum, rationibus inter se certantes, non, qui nos nuper adeo literas inquinare cœpit, convitiis, turpi sectu impotentis animi. *Gros. de jur. B. & P. proleg. §. 52.*

ness of Logick are particularly adapted to the purposes of Oratory; and therefore entertain us more agreeably, than what others have delivered upon the same subject with a main view to abstruser points in Philosophy: But still the substance of it in both cases appears beyond contradiction to be the same, however varied it may be in it's application. Let then the Authority of those celebrated Authors be allowed to overrule a popular objection, that is too favourably admitted against this Art; as if the study of it was at best a trifling amusement, and, not only useless, but, destructive to all taste of polite learning. --- And with regard to the figure, which any profound Logician is likely to make upon the scene of active life; It happens to him, as, in the ordinary course of things, it must to every man, that will give himself true pains, to lay a foundation of sound scholarship, in any other branch of useful learning: "The Hermitage of his study has made him somewhat uncouth in the world, and men make him worse by staring on him. He is silly and ridiculous, and it continues with him for some quarter of a year out of the University. But practise him a little in men, and brush him over with good company, and he shall out-balance the Glisterers, as far as a solid substance does a feather, or Gold gold Lace".

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1 Bp *Eggle's* Characters.





MUSEUM  
BRITAN-  
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